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Engel and Rogers (1996) find that crossing the US-Canada border can considerably raise 
relative price volatility and that exchange rate fluctuations explain about one-third of the 
volatility increase. In re-evaluating the border effect, this study shows that cross-country 
heterogeneity in price volatility can lead to significant bias in measuring the border effect 
unless proper adjustment is made to correct it. The analysis explores the implication of 
symmetric sampling for border effect estimation. Moreover, using a direct decomposition 
method, two conditions governing the strength of the border effect are identified. In 
particular, the more dissimilar the price shocks are across countries, the greater the border 
effect will be. Decomposition estimates also suggest that exchange rate fluctuations actually 
account for a large majority of the border effect. 
JEL Code: F31, F41. 







Department of Economics 
University of California at Santa Cruz 
California, CA 95964 
USA 
cheung.@ucsc.edu 
Kon S. Lai 
Department of Economics and Statistics 
California State University 






The authors are appreciative of all the comments from two anonymous referees. We are 
grateful to Michael Dooley, Charles Engel, Paul De Grauwe, Ronald McDonald, Michael 
Melvin, Jan-Egbert Sturm, Shang-Jin Wei, and participants of the CESifo Area Conference 
and the ASU seminar for additional comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. We 
would also like to thank John Rogers for providing the Canadian and US data used in the 
study. 1.  Introduction 
 
  The substantial price dispersion observed between similar goods at different locations is 
indicative of persistent deviations from the law of one price.  Engel (1993, 1999) suggest that 
real exchange rate variability is ascribed largely to relative price movements between similar 
goods across borders.  Using a creative method of inter- versus intra-country analysis of intercity 
prices, Engel and Rogers (1996) (hereafter referred to as ER) show that the national border is an 
important determinant of relative price volatility even after making due allowance for the role of 
distance.  Compared to within-country relative prices, cross-border relative prices are found to 
have considerably higher volatility.  The finding is intriguing.  The national border matters:  It 
has a sizeable positive impact on relative price volatility. 
Based on regression estimates, the ER study finds that while intercity distance accounts for 
some of the increase in relative price volatility, the border effect far exceeds the distance effect 
in magnitude.  Exchange rate variability, together with price stickiness, may have played a 
significant role in the border effect.  Price stickiness can be supplemented with local currency 
pricing, which severely limits exchange rate pass-through into prices (Feenstra and Kendall, 
1997; Engel and Rogers, 2001b).  The volatile-exchange-rate-cum-sticky-price consideration is, 
nonetheless, found to explain much less than half of the border effect.  The border effect research 
has been extended in different directions in recent studies, including Engel and Rogers (2000, 
2001a, 2001b), Parsley and Wei (2001), Depken and Sonora (2002), Ceglowski (2003), Cheung 
et al. (2001), Cheung and Fujii (2005), and Crucini et al. (2005).
1  The fact that a rather large 
proportion of the border effect is still unaccounted for remains a puzzle. 
This study contributes by re-evaluating the border effect in several ways.  The first 
contribution is methodological.  If foreign and domestic prices share the same volatility, the 
inter- versus intra-country analysis would always yield unbiased border effect estimates.  This 
cross-country homogeneity condition seems unnecessarily stringent and is generally violated by 
actual data.
2  When extending the analysis to general cases with heterogeneity, we show that a 
symmetric sampling strategy, under which the same number of cities is sampled from each 
country, can be used to secure unbiased border effect estimates. 
  Moreover, using a decomposition method, we analyze the contributing components of the 
border effect and establish analytically the conditions for its general applicability.  Two 
  - 1 -sufficient conditions for the border effect to occur are identified: (1) fluctuating exchange rates 
coupled with sticky prices, and (2) cross-border relative prices are driven by more dissimilar, as 
opposed to common, shocks than are within-country relative prices.  The first condition is well 
discussed in the literature, but the second is not.  For the latter, dissimilar shocks, which can be 
micro- or macroeconomic in nature, reduce price comovement across countries and make their 
relative prices more variable than those within the same country.  Since both conditions are 
generally valid, the border effect is likely to be prevalent in relative price data. 
The border effect decomposition also offers a more direct and exact way to quantify the 
exchange rate contribution than the ER analysis does.  This alternative method for measuring the 
exchange rate contribution to the border effect can avert the collinearity problem that afflicts the 
regression approach used in other border effect studies.  Better measurement of the exchange 
rate contribution – which requires accurate estimates of both the border effect and its exchange 
rate component – is important.  The measurement bears on the issue in the large unexplained 
portion of the border effect.  Our decomposition estimates indicate that exchange rate 
fluctuations actually explain the majority of the border effect. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow.  Section 2 examines the implication of 
cross-country heterogeneity in price volatility for measuring the border effect.  Section 3 
analyzes the different contributing components of the border effect and its prevalence.  Section 4 
verifies the validity of our analytical results based on the ER data.  Section 5 reports further 
evidence for the significant contribution of dissimilar shocks to the border effect.  Section 6 
summarizes our main results. 
 
2.  Cross-country heterogeneity and the border effect measurement 
 
Cross-border relative prices between cities k and i (denoted by ) are given by  c
ki t q ,
c
ki t q ,  =  – – e d
k t p ,
f
i t p , t   for k = 1, ..., r  and  i = 1, ..., s    (1) 
where et is the dollar price of the foreign currency and and are goods prices, with the 
superscripts d and f indicating the US and foreign cities, respectively.  Likewise, relative prices 
between within-country cities k and m (denoted by with w = d and f) are given by 
d
k t p ,
f
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  - 2 -Following the ER analysis, all variables are expressed in terms of their first-differences in 
logarithms.
3  Equation (1) suggests a simple decomposition of the volatility of cross-border 
relative prices: 
Var( ) = Var( – ) + Var(e c
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From equation (2), the volatility of within-country relative prices is 
Var( ) = Var( – ) for  w = d and f (3b)  w
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k t p ,
w
m t p ,
Let AVG[ ⋅ ] be the sample average of an intercity variable across relevant city pairs.  Let 
Var( ) denote AVG[Var( )], and let Var( ) denote AVG[Var( )].  Using the average 
volatility of within-country relative prices as a yardstick, the “excess” volatility of cross-border 
relative prices is measured by 
c
t q c
ki t q ,
w
t q w
km t q ,
δ = Var( ) – Var( ).     (4)  c
t q w
t q
A regression-based measure of δ may alternatively be used, as in the ER study.  When intercity 
relative price volatility is regressed on a constant and a border dummy variable, the same δ value 
is captured by the regression coefficient on the border dummy.  The decomposition approach is 
pursued here because it offers unique and deeper insight into the estimation, causes, and general 
applicability of the border effect. 
 In  measuring  Var( ), every cross-border city pair contains one US city and one foreign 
city, and so US and foreign cities are automatically sampled at the same frequency.  This is not 
the case when measuring Var( ), however, unless the data sample has been purposely 





d) equals the number of foreign 
city pairs (denoted by nf).  Var( ) is essentially a weighted average of Var( ) and Var( ), 
where Var( ) = AVG[Var( )] and Var( ) = AVG[Var( )].  Since Var( ) and Var( ) 

















d equal nf?  The original ER analysis does 
not account for this sampling issue.  Only when foreign and domestic prices share the same 
average volatility does the analysis, whether nd equals nf or not, always produce unbiased 
decomposition estimates of the border effect, δ.  The cross-country condition of equal average 
volatility is unnecessarily stringent.  In more general cases that allow for heterogeneity in price 
volatility across countries, we find that unbiased estimates may still be obtained for δ when nd 
equals nf. 












The bias can be upward or downward, depending upon whether nd is greater or less than nf and 






d  ≠ nf (the authors owe this illustrative example to Charles Engel).  To simplify 
computation, city prices are of equal volatility within a country, i.e., Var( ) = Var( ) =  
and Var( ) = Var( ) = .  We also consider that the correlation coefficient ρ for price 
changes is the same for every cross-border city pair (i.e., Cov( , ) = ), that the 
correlation coefficient for price changes is the same for every within-country pair (i.e., 
Cov( , ) =  and Cov( , ) = ), and that the net exchange rate effect for every 
cross-border pair is given by ξ = Var(e
d
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So long as nd = nf, the same estimate of excess volatility will correctly be obtained: 
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If skewed sampling (i.e., nd ≠ nf) is applied, however, the excess volatility estimate will be given 
by 
δSK = Var( ) – {n c
t q dVar( ) + n d
t q fVar( )}/(n
f
t q d + nf), (8) 
which produces an estimation bias of the following size: 
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The presence of deviations from the law of one price implies that < 1.  Hence, δ w ρ SK ≠ δ 
unless  just happens to equal .  The border effect estimate can be increased or decreased 
systematically by varying the relative numbers of foreign and US cities sampled.  If US prices 
were more (less) volatile than foreign prices, sampling more US than foreign cities – as in the 
ER data sample – would underestimate (overestimate) the border effect unless we can find a 




  - 4 -  Leaving out the apparent complexity of economic analysis, the basic result should be 
simple and general.  It should be noted that the problem with skewed samples is not specific to 
the ER analysis only, but is generic to inter- versus intra-group analysis involving heterogeneous 
populations in general.  Skewed samples will bias estimation of cross-group effects when parings 
are drawn from populations with unequal means or variances (see Appendix for a non-economic 
example). 
 
3.  Further decomposition of the border effect 
 
After examining how to secure unbiased estimates of the border effect, we now turn to 
questions about the prevalence of the border effect and its contributing components:  Should the 
border effect be commonly observed in all cross-border data?  If so, what contributes to the 
general existence of excess relative price volatility?  How much of the border effect is 
attributable to exchange rate fluctuations? 
The border effect can be broken into two parts – one relates to the exchange rate and one 
does not: 
δ = ξ + π       (10) 
where ξ = Var(et) – 2AVG[Cov(et, - )] and π = AVG[Var( - )] – 
AVG[Var( - )].  Let Var( ) = AVG[Var( )] and Var( ) = AVG[Var( )].  The non-
exchange rate component π can be further rewritten such that: 
d
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where η + υ = π  and 
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The last term υ, which captures part of the measurement bias noted in equation (5), exists only 
for skewed samples.
3  When nd = nf, υ = 0 and so η = π.  Hence, for non-skewed samples, δ = ξ + 
η exactly.  The validity of this simple adding-up condition can be checked and verified 
empirically. 
  For skewed samples, on the other hand, δ ≠ ξ + η.  In cases of nd > nf, for instance, we will 
  - 5 -obtain that δ < ξ + η when Var( ) > Var( ), but that δ > ξ + η when Var( ) < Var( ).  
The former case signifies underestimation of δ, whereas the latter case signifies overestimation 
of δ.  As demonstrated in section 2, when domestic prices are more (less) volatile than foreign 








d > nf underestimates (overestimates) δ.  In turn, underestimating δ will result in δ 
< ξ + η, while overestimating δ will lead to δ > ξ + η.  Nevertheless, except when severe 
underestimation of δ occurs, whether the border effect on relative price volatility is positive or 
not is determined ultimately by the values of ξ and η. 
 
A. The general applicability of the border effect 
 
  The simple decomposition can help assess – and bring out the general applicability of – the 
border effect.  As the decomposition shows, if ξ and η are both positive, excess volatility will 
occur in cross-border relative prices.  The ξ component indicates the net exchange rate effect.  It 
incorporates not only exchange rate variability but also short-run comovement between 
exchange rates and prices.  The latter recognizes possible adjustment of prices in response to 
exchange rate changes.  Since prices are sticky in the short run and exchange rate pass-through is 
far from complete, the covariance term is rather small compared to Var(et).  Since Var(et) is 
always positive, ξ should be positive as well. 
Like ξ, η is typically positive.  It represents the differential between the covariation of 
prices within the same country and that of prices across countries.  In general, intercity prices 
can be considered driven by a combination of dissimilar (weakly correlated) and common 
(strongly correlated) shocks.  The more the cities are subject to dissimilar – as opposed to 
common – shocks, the weaker the intercity price comovement.  There are good reasons for 
significant dissimilar shocks to prevail between countries.  For instance, usual macroeconomic 
shocks (e.g., changes in money supply, federal taxes, government spending, or productivity) are 
country-specific.  Such shocks may act as common shocks to cities within the same country, but 
as dissimilar shocks to cities of different countries.  Some microeconomic shocks (e.g., changes 
in tastes or transportation costs) also tend to be more similar – and induce more correlated price 
changes – for cities within the same border than for cities separated by a border.  All in all, the 
border matters because cross-border relative prices are likely subject to more dissimilar and less 
common shocks than within-country relative prices are.  Within-country price covariation should 
  - 6 -thus be stronger than cross-border price covariation, and so η > 0.  We will refer to this as the 
differential shock effect.
5
A Monte Carlo experiment can illustrate that dissimilar shocks across countries can 
generate excess relative price volatility.  To simplify, both the home country and the foreign 
country are considered to have two cities, with the following data generating processes for price 
changes: 
d
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where ak and bi are some constants and and denote price innovations.  The innovation 
variance is standardized to equal unity so that Var( ) = 1 = Var( ).  Let the cross-border 












i t, ε c.  Let the within-country correlation of price shocks 
be the same in both countries such that Cov( , ) = ρ d
t 1 , ε d
t 2 , ε w = Cov( , ).  If price shocks are 
more (less) dissimilar for cross-border city pairs than for within-country pairs, then ρ
f
t 1 , ε
f
t 2 , ε
c < ρw (ρc > 
ρw).  To focus the analysis on the differential shock effect, the exchange rate component, which 
is being treated as fixed, is omitted. 
In the simulation experiment, we arbitrarily set ρw equal to 0.5 and ρc equal to 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 
0.7 or 0.9.  The simple design covers different interesting situations, including ρc < ρw, ρc = ρw, 
and ρc > ρw.  In each replication, excess relative price volatility δ is computed.  Simulation 
results are obtained based on 10,000 replications, and they are reported in Table 1.  The results 
show that the size of the border effect is determined systematically by the value of ρc relative to 
ρw.  In the case of main interest here, when ρc < ρw (i.e., when shocks to cross-border prices are 
less correlated than those to within-country prices), the δ estimate is significantly greater than 
zero.  The smaller the value of ρc, the greater the border effect.  The results confirm that when 
price shocks are less correlated between countries than within countries, the differential impact 
of such shocks on cross-border prices raises relative price volatility. 
 
 
Table 1. Monte Carlo results for the border effect generated by dissimilar shocks 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Mean  estimate  of  δ  Standard deviation of δ 
  - 7 -____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ρc = 0.1 < ρw     0.800    0.135 
ρc = 0.3 < ρw         0.401    0.097 
ρc = 0.5 = ρw     0.001    0.061 
ρc = 0.7 > ρw     −0.400   0.037 
ρc = 0.9 > ρw   −0.820   0.025 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  The border effect on relative price volatility is measured by δ.  ρc indicates the correlation of price 
shocks for cross-border city pairs, and ρw indicates the correlation of price shocks for within-country city 
pairs (ρw is set equal to 0.5 in simulation).  In the cases where ρc < ρw, price shocks are more dissimilar for 
cross-border city pairs than for within-country pairs.  In the cases where ρc > ρw, price shocks are less 
dissimilar for cross-border city pairs than for within-country pairs.  All the simulation estimates reported 
are based on 10,000 replications. 
 
In sum, the sufficient conditions for the border effect to occur are: (i) volatile exchange 
rates operating under sticky prices, and (ii) cross-border relative prices are driven by more 
dissimilar shocks (and less common shocks) than are within-country relative prices.  The former 
ensures a positive exchange rate effect on relative price volatility, while the latter produces a 
positive differential shock effect on relative price volatility.
6  With these two conditions being 
generally satisfied in practice, the border effect on relative price volatility will exist widely in 
cross-border data.  All else being equal, the more significant the dissimilar shocks across 
countries, the greater the border effect. 
 
B. Measuring the contribution of exchange rate fluctuations 
 
  The volatility decomposition not just helps establish the generality of the border effect 
result, but also provides a direct, simple way to measure the exchange rate contribution to the 
border effect.  The importance of the exchange rate contribution has been a debated issue.  
Previous border effect studies commonly use a dummy variable to capture the border effect in 
regression analysis.  Due to a collinearity problem between the exchange rate variable and the 
border variable, the contribution of exchange rate volatility cannot be measured directly using 
the regression method. 
  The decomposition technique, by contrast, circumvents the collinearity problem.  It 
provides a straightforward method for measuring the exchange rate contribution.  Specifically, 
the exchange rate contribution to the border effect can be computed as a simple ratio: Var(et)/δ in 
  - 8 -gross term or ξ /δ in net term.  Comparable to what the ER study analyzes, the Var(et)/δ measure 
gauges the contribution in terms of exchange rate volatility only.  The ξ /δ measure is similar to 
the Var(et)/δ measure, but it partials out possible interaction effects between exchange rate and 
price changes, including exchange rate pass-through into prices.  In this way, the ξ /δ measure 
gives the net exchange rate contribution to the border effect.  Either measure underscores the 
importance of obtaining unbiased estimates for the border effect, as analyzed in section 2.  If the 
δ estimate is biased, no accurate evaluation of the exchange rate contribution can be made.  
Empirical estimates of the border effect from the ER data are next reported. 
 
4.  Decomposition estimates of the contributing components of the border effect 
 
The ER study examines Canadian (CN) and US consumer prices for 14 different categories 
of goods, hereafter labeled by {G-1, G-2, ..., G-14}, which comprise about 95% of consumer 
expenditures (see the original study for detailed descriptions).  The data cover the period from 
June 1978 through December 1994, and the whole dataset includes a total of 9 CN and 14 US 
cities.  Monthly price data are available for all the CN cities (Calgary, Edmonton, Montreal, 
Ottawa, Quebec, Regina, Toronto, Vancouver and Winnipeg) and 4 “core” US cities (Chicago, 
Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and New York).  For 5 additional US cities (Dallas, Detroit, Houston, 
Pittsburgh and San Francisco), price data are given in even-numbered months.  For 5 other US 
cities (Baltimore, Boston, Miami, St. Louis and Washington DC), data are available for odd-
numbered months.  All price changes are calculated as two-month differences in logarithms of 
price indices and expressed in terms of percentage changes. 
With the ER sample (9 CN and 14 US cities) being skewed toward US cities, equations 
(11) and (13) predict that δ < ξ + η when Var( ) > Var( ), but that δ > ξ + η when Var( ) < 









  - 9 -Table 2. Estimation of the border effect and its breakdown components 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Goods       Adding-up    Exchange rate contribution to δ   
index  Var( )  Var( )  δ  ξ  η condition  Gross:  Var(e
f
t p d
t p t)/δ Net:  ξ/δ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    
(A) Skewed sample: nf = 36 <  nd = 66 (Engel and Rogers, 1996) 
 
G-1 4.09  1.91  3.38  1.89    0.73  δ > ξ + η 74.8%  56.0% 
G-2  1.21  1.06  3.20 2.64 0.43  δ > ξ + η 79.1%  82.6% 
G-3  2.56  2.50  4.31 3.01 1.20  δ > ξ + η 58.6%  69.7% 
G-4  0.83  3.20  3.09 2.70 1.02  δ < ξ + η 82.0%  87.5% 
G-5  6.83  19.41  6.65 1.77 8.99  δ < ξ + η 38.0%  26.6% 
G-6  0.91  2.43  2.48 2.60 0.23  δ < ξ + η 102.1%  104.8% 
G-7  3.02  17.77  4.53 2.18 6.50  δ < ξ + η 55.8%  48.0% 
G-8 3.66  67.92 13.82  1.94  30.00  δ < ξ + η 18.3%  14.1% 
G-9  3.91  23.83  1.14 2.44 1.35  δ < ξ + η 221.1%  213.3% 
G-10  3.47  3.05  4.71 2.29 2.20  δ > ξ + η 53.7%  48.7% 
G-11 24.79  15.57  24.44 2.46  18.28  δ > ξ + η 10.3%  10.1% 
G-12  3.45  1.05  4.41 2.91 0.69  δ > ξ + η 57.3%  65.9% 
G-13  1.73  3.56  2.35 2.42 0.20  δ < ξ + η 107.6%  103.0% 
G-14  0.79  2.27  2.54 2.49 0.28  δ < ξ + η 99.5%  98.1% 
Average  4.37  11.82  5.63 2.41 5.15  δ < ξ + η 75.6%  73.5% 
 
(B) Non-skewed sample: nf = 36 = nd
 
G-1  4.09  1.74  2.99 1.94 1.05  δ = ξ + η 89.4%  64.8% 
G-2  1.21  0.88  3.43 2.87 0.56  δ = ξ + η 78.0%  83.7% 
G-3  2.56  2.35  4.50 3.11 1.39  δ = ξ + η 59.5%  69.0% 
G-4  0.83  3.44  4.05 3.00 1.05  δ = ξ + η 66.1%  74.0% 
G-5  6.83  20.21  9.68 2.00 7.69  δ = ξ + η 27.6%  20.6% 
G-6  0.91  2.28  3.15 2.81 0.33  δ = ξ + η 85.0%  89.5% 
G-7  3.02  14.66  7.64 1.83 5.81  δ = ξ + η 35.0%  24.0% 
G-8 3.66  51.81 15.26  1.27  13.99  δ = ξ + η 17.5%  8.3% 
G-9  3.91  20.84  3.55 2.58 0.97  δ = ξ + η 75.4%  72.8% 
G-10  3.47  3.31  4.61 2.48 2.13  δ = ξ + η 57.9%  53.8% 
G-11 24.79  15.98  25.93 2.14  23.79  δ = ξ + η 10.3%  8.2% 
G-12  3.45  0.96  4.08 3.16 0.92  δ = ξ + η 65.5%  77.4% 
G-13  1.73  3.37  3.02 2.64 0.38  δ = ξ + η 88.5%  87.5% 
G-14  0.79  2.43  3.12 2.73 0.39  δ = ξ + η 85.7%  87.6% 
Average  4.37  10.30  6.69 2.47 4.32  δ = ξ + η 60.1%  58.7% 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Notes:  nf indicates the number of CN-CN pairs, and nd is the number of US-US pairs for each goods 
index.  Var( ) indicates the average volatility of foreign prices, whereas Var( ) indicates the average 
volatility of US prices.  For the volatility calculation, all price changes are measured as percentage 
changes.  The column “δ” gives estimates of excess volatility in cross-border relative prices.  When 





t)/δ” and “ξ/ δ” indicates the gross and net contributions of the exchange rate to the border effect, 
respectively. 
 
  - 10 -Panel A of Table 2 contains estimates of δ, ξ, and η from the ER sample.  Results are given 
for individual goods indices.  As shown, the estimates of ξ and η invariably confirm that the 
contributions from the exchange rate effect and the differential shock effect are both positive.  In 
all cases, δ > 0 and thus excess relative price volatility exists.  Comparing estimates between δ, 
ξ, and η reveals exactly the same pattern predicted by theoretical analysis.  For the 8 goods 
indices with Var( ) > Var( ), we have δ < ξ + η.  For the 6 other goods indices with Var( ) 
< Var( ), we have δ > ξ + η.  Averaging across all 14 goods indices, the volatility of US prices 








  As an interesting contrast to the ER sample, we examine an alternative, non-skewed sample 
that includes 9 CN and 9 US cities only.  The ER sample includes all 14 US cities with combined 
use of even-month and odd-month data.  To adopt symmetric sampling, odd-month data for 5 US 
cities are dropped from the sample here.  The new sample now contains 36 CN-CN pairs and 36 
US-US pairs, along with 81 CN-US pairs.  Given that US-US and CN-CN city pairs are equal in 
number, there is no bias in the decomposition estimate of the border effect.  With nd = nf, the 
theoretical analysis predicts the adding-up condition, δ = ξ + η, to prevail, independent of 




    As shown by Panel B of Table 2, the theoretical prediction is totally borne out by the 
empirical estimates from the non-skewed sample.  All the estimates of δ, ξ, and η are positive for 
individual goods indices.
7  The contributions of ξ and η also add up exactly to the border effect 
in every case, satisfying the adding-up condition for unbiased estimation.  On average, the non-
skewed sample – as predicted – yields a markedly higher border effect than the ER sample does. 
 The average δ estimate from the non-skewed sample is almost 20% greater than that from the 
ER sample.  In relative term, the border effect on relative price volatility is given by δ/Var( ).  
Based on our calculation, δ/Var( ) is on average equal to 0.771 for the non-skewed sample as 
opposed to 0.496 for the ER sample.  Accordingly, crossing the border on average raises relative 





  Based on indirect approximation measurements, the ER study estimates the average 
contribution of exchange rate volatility to be about 30% of the border effect, implying that most 
of the border effect comes from non-exchange rate sources.  The ER estimate is surprisingly low. 
 When prices are sticky, cross-border relative price movement is expected to reflect in large part 
  - 11 -exchange rate changes.  Exchange rate contribution estimates are reported in the last two 
columns of Table 2.  In 10 of the 14 cases, the exchange rate explains more than half of the 
border effect.  For the ER sample, exchange rate volatility explains, on average, 73.5% of the 
border effect.
8  For the non-skewed sample, the average contribution of exchange rate volatility 
is calculated to be 60.1%.  Even after adjusting for possible effects of exchange rate changes on 
prices, the net exchange rate contribution is computed to be 58.7% on average. 
 
5.  Additional evidence for the differential shock effect 
 
In accord with our decomposition analysis, the simulation results have earlier shown that 
when price shocks are more dissimilar across the border than within the same country, they 
result in excess volatility in cross-border relative prices.  The reported η estimates are invariably  
 
Table 3. Intercity covariance estimates for price shocks 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Goods           Average intercity covariance of price shocks            
index    Within-country pairs  Cross-border pairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
G-1   0.826  0.647 
G-2   0.280  0.023 
G-3   0.703  0.258 
G-4   0.272  0.082 
G-5   1.070  0.441 
G-6   0.179  0.063 
G-7   0.729  0.202 
G-8   1.585  0.411 
G-9   0.905  0.838 
G-10   1.406  0.844 
G-11   6.533  1.465 
G-12   0.101  0.061 
G-13   0.269  0.130 
G-14   0.203  0.104 
 
Average estimate  1.076  0.398 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  Price shocks are constructed as the innovations estimated from fitting an autoregressive process to 
the relevant price series for each city, with the lag order determined by a data-dependent lag selection 
method based on the Akaike information criterion.
 
  - 12 -positive, and they are indicative of the differential shock effect.  To seek additional evidence for 
the impact of dissimilar shocks, the innovation part of price changes is identified and isolated 
from their deterministic part by fitting a high-order autoregressive process with seasonal 
dummies to price data for each city.  The lag order is determined using the standard Akaike 
information criterion.
9  The covariance of price innovations is constructed for every city pair in 
the non-skewed sample.  The more dissimilar the price shocks, the weaker the covariation of 
shocks.  If dissimilar shocks are significant across countries, the covariance of cross-border price 
shocks should be much lower than of within-country shocks.  Average covariance estimates for 
price innovations are given in Table 3, and they bear out the dissimilar-shock proposition.  For 
all the goods indices, shocks to cross-border relative prices are much more dissimilar than 
shocks to within-country relative prices. 
 
To gather further evidence on the effect of dissimilar shocks, regression analysis is next 
conducted for each goods index based on the non-skewed sample.  There are 72 within-country 
(36 US-US and 36 CN-CN) city pairs and 81 cross-border city pairs, yielding a total of 153 
observations.  The regression equation is specified as:
10














ψ j,k (15) 
where RPVj,k represents the relative price volatility for cities j and k, DISTj,k is the log of the 
distance between the cities for the city pair, BDj,k is the border dummy variable (BDj,k = 1 when a 
border exists between cities j and k; BDj,k = 0 otherwise), SCVj,k represents the covariance of 
price shocks for cities j and k, ERj,k captures the net exchange rate effect (ξj,k = Var(et) − 2Cov(et, 
pt,j − pt,k) for cross-border city pairs;  ξj,k  = 0 otherwise), and εj,k is the random error.  Dummy 
variables for individual cities ( = 1 when r = j or k and = 0 otherwise, and = 1 when s 





 being the number of cities sampled from each 
country.  These city dummy variables allow price variance to vary across cities.  The coefficient 
for the exchange rate variable, φ4, will be imposed as unity – in accord with equation (3a) – to 
avert the collinearity problem with the border dummy.  In the presence of other explanatory 
variables, the border dummy captures the unexplained part of the border effect.  To the extent 
that distance and the border both raise relative price volatility, we expect to find φ1 > 0, φ2 > 0.   
Table 4. Regression results explaining relative price volatility 
  - 13 -____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Goods          Coefficient estimates and significance         BD omitted  
index  DIST  BD  SCV  ξ     Adj.  R




G-1   0.027   0.383   -2.174  1.000    0.98  0.98 
   (0.048)   (0.054)
**   (0.136)
**  
G-2   -0.005   0.208   -1.484  1.000    0.99  0.99 
 (0.015)  (0.057)
** (0.148)
**  
G-3    -0.011 0.773  -1.684 1.000    0.98 0.97 
 (0.039)  (0.098)
** (0.136)
**  





G-5  0.787 5.669  -3.161 1.000    0.90 0.87 
 (0.799)  (0.929)
** (0.619)
**  
G-6    0.003 0.111  -1.904 1.000    0.99 0.99 
 (0.021)  (0.045)
** (0.181)
**  
G-7  0.128 3.710  -1.990 1.000    0.97 0.96 
 (0.203)  (0.374)
** (0.306)
**  
G-8 0.843  10.180  -2.155  1.000    0.94  0.93 
 (0.713)  (1.772)
** (0.623)
**  
G-9    0.212 0.800  -2.024 1.000    0.99 0.99 
 (0.194)  (0.265)
** (0.362)
**  










G-12  0.015 0.963  -1.770 1.000    0.99 0.99 
 (0.055)  (0.069)
** (0.280)
**  
G-13 -0.004 0.109  -1.946 1.000    0.99 0.99 
 (0.029)  (0.045)
** (0.090)
**  






coefficient  0.267 2.494  -1.864 1.000    0.97 0.96 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the intercity relative price volatility (RPV), and the explanatory 
variables include DT (intercity distance, measured in logarithms and in miles), BD (the border dummy), 
SCV (intercity covariance of price innovations), ξ (the net exchange rate effect), and 18 city dummy 
variables.  The coefficient on ξ is imposed as unity.  The coefficient estimates for all the 18 city dummy 
variables are omitted to conserve space.  There are 153 observations in each regression, and the data are 
based on the non-skewed sample with 9 Canadian and 9 US cities.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.  Statistical significance is indicated by double asterisks ( 
** ) for the 1% 
level and a single asterisk ( 
* ) for the 5% level.  The column “Adj. R
2” gives the adjusted coefficient of 
determination for the corresponding regression. 
 
On the other hand, if dissimilar shocks cause higher relative price volatility, we expect to find φ3 
  - 14 -< 0. 
Table 4 reports the regression results for individual goods indices (coefficient estimates for 
the 18 city dummy variables are not reported to conserve space).  These results are generally 
consistent with those from our earlier decomposition analysis.  The regression equation fits the 
data extremely well, with an adjusted R
2 value of 0.97 on average.  Interestingly, the adjusted R
2 
value can remain similarly high even if the border dummy is omitted.  This suggests that the 
unexplained portion of the border effect becomes small once the other explanatory variables (in 
particular, the covariation of price shocks and the variability of the nominal exchange rate) are 
included.  Moreover, even after controlling for the distance effect, the price-shock coefficient is 
strongly significant and has the correct negative sign in every case.
11  In accordance with the 
proposition of differential shock effects, the results indicate that the more dissimilar the price 
shocks are, the greater the relative price volatility will be. 
It should be noted that, like using the symmetric sampling strategy, the two groups of city 
dummy variables can actually help correct the potential bias in estimating the border effect (the 
authors owe this point to an anonymous referee).  Each group of city dummy variables functions 
together as, in effect, a country dummy variable:  one for those city pairs that contain a US city, 
and another for city pairs that include a Canadian city.  These two groups of city dummies can 
thus account for the possible difference in number between US-US and CN-CN city pairs.  
Following a similar line of analysis of the issue, a recent study by Gorodnichenko and Tesar 
(2005) also identifies the potential bias in border effect estimation induced by cross-country 
heterogeneity in price variance.  To correct the possible bias, Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2005) 
propose an alternative method through the use of country-specific dummy variables. 
All in all, the potential bias in measuring the border effect can either be corrected in 
regression analysis using city or country dummy variables, or can be averted altogether using a 
symmetric sampling method.  Having already adopted the latter method, our statistical analysis 
in (15) does not really need to include city dummy variables.  To verify this, the estimation was 
redone by dropping all the city dummy variables (for a total of 18 of them).  With a much fewer 
number of regressors being used, the resulted regression model enjoyed greater efficiency in 
estimation and, more importantly, it yielded similar estimates of both the border effect and the 
differential shock effect.  This confirms the role of symmetric sampling in securing unbiased 
estimates.  On the other hand, the symmetric sampling method is crucial and necessary to our 
  - 15 -decomposition analysis for which the method of dummy variables cannot be used.  In contrast to 
regression analysis, which cannot overcome the problem of collinearity between the border 
dummy and the exchange rate variable, the more direct decomposition analysis is able to provide 
precise estimates of the exchange rate contribution to the border effect. 
Finally, we recognize that dissimilar price shocks may possibly reflect some systematic 
patterns of intercity economic changes.  In particular, economic factors that can influence 
intercity price comovement can be potential contributors.  Except for wages, city-level data on 
cost and demand factors relevant to our analysis are not readily available, especially for 
Canadian cities.  The ER study notes that national labor markets separated by a border should be 
less integrated than local labor markets within a country.  We experimented with regression 
analysis to ascertain whether the differential shock effect was attributable in part to intercity 
wage changes.  We found that wage changes explained little, if any, of the differential shock 
effect.  As a result, no wage variables were included in the final regression equation.
 
6.  Conclusion       
 
This study has provided further evidence for the significant border effect on relative price 
volatility.  Using a decomposition of relative price volatility different from that considered by 
Engel and Rogers (1996), this study re-evaluates both the size and the general applicability of 
the border effect.  The decomposition also enables us to quantify the exact contribution of 
exchange rate fluctuations to the border effect.  It circumvents the collinearity problem that 
afflicts the regression method typically used in other studies. 
Moreover, the decomposition offers potentially useful information about the channels or 
sources through which the border effect may come from.  The border effect is shown to capture 
both the exchange rate effect and the effect of dissimilar shocks.  Unlike the exchange rate 
effect, the dissimilar-shock effect has not been well analyzed in the literature.  Exploring this 
non-exchange rate channel may help identify alternative sources of the border effect.  
Analytically, any micro or macroeconomic factors that can induce significant differential price 
movement across countries may be a potential contributor.  Apart from recognizing the exchange 
rate contribution, previous studies have focused mainly on microeconomic factors (e.g., 
geographic distance, trade barriers and costs, and marketing structures) to account for the 
  - 16 -remaining unexplained border effect.  This analysis suggests that macroeconomic shocks can be 
sufficiently dissimilar across countries to generate extra volatility in cross-border relative prices 
by inducing differential relative price movement.  A pertinent question then is, how much of the 
observed border effect can be explained by the cross-country dissimilarity of macroeconomic 
shocks?  This presents an interesting empirical issue for future research. 
Overall, the decomposition analysis succeeds in gaining new insight into the estimation, 
contributing components, and general existence of the border effect.  The main results are 
summed up as follows: 
(1) When examining general cases that allow for cross-country heterogeneity in price volatility, 
unbiased estimates of the border effect may still be obtained when equal numbers of foreign 
and home city pairs are sampled from the data. 
(2) When a skewed sample is used, the estimation bias can be upward or downward, depending 
on the specific sample mix from the different populations. 
(3) The sufficient conditions for the border effect to occur are: (i) fluctuating exchange rates 
coupled with sticky prices, and (ii) cross-border relative prices are subject to more dissimilar 
and less common shocks than are within-country relative prices.  Other things being equal, 
the more (less) significant the dissimilar (common) shocks across countries, the greater the 
border effect. 
(4) The two conditions for the existence of the border effect are generally valid, suggesting that 
the border effect on relative price volatility is likely to exist widely in cross-border price 
data. 
(5) Consistent with sticky prices, exchange rate fluctuations are actually found to contribute to a 
large majority of the border effect, much higher than the indirect estimate of about 30% 
reported by the Engel-Rogers study.  On average across goods indices, about 60% of the 
border effect is explained by exchange rate fluctuations, leaving 40% to be explained by non-
exchange rate sources. 
  - 17 -Appendix: Inter- versus intra-group pairings from heterogeneous populations 
 
  To illustrate the generality of our point, let us look at a non-economic example.  Suppose 
that there are two baskets of balls, one carrying red balls (each weighs ω
R pounds) and the other 
carrying blue balls (each weighs ω
B pounds, with ω
B < ω
R).  The condition, ω
B < ω
R, indicates 
that two ball populations differ in average weight.  Two red balls (say, R1 and R2) and three blue 
balls (say, B1, B2, and B3) are sampled from the baskets, and these balls are paired off two at a 
time in different possible combinations.  The mixed-color sample has 6 possible pairs: (R1, B1), 
(R1, B2), (R1, B3), (R2, B1), (R2, B2), and (R2, B3), while the same-color sample has 4 possible 
pairs: (R1, R2), (B1, B2), (B1, B3), and (B2, B3).  For mixed-color pairs, the average ball weight is 
given by (ω
R + ω
B)/2.  For same-color pairs, the average weight is given by (ω
R + 3ω
B)/4.  The 
difference in average weight between mixed-color and same-color pairs is given by δ = (ω
R – 
ω
B)/4 > 0.  This will incorrectly suggest that simply mixing balls of different colors together can 
add to weight. 
  If equal numbers of red and blue balls were sampled (e.g., three red and three blue balls), 
however, the average ball weight for same-color pairs would equal (ω
R + ω
B)/2.  For mixed-color 
pairs, the average weight would still equal (ω
R + ω
B)/2.  The difference in average weight 
between mixed-color and same-color pairs would then be given by δ = 0.  Hence, non-skewed 
samples would correctly show that mixing balls does not alter weight. 
  In essence, this example shows that skewed samples can produce biased estimates when 
parings are drawn from heterogeneous populations and that unbiased estimates can be fully 
secured by simply using non-skewed samples. 
 
  - 18 -Footnotes 
1 Intercity price data have been keenly analyzed.  Instead of investigating relative price 
volatility, some recent studies (e.g., Cecchetti et al., 2002) focus on the persistence of price 
convergence. 
2 Analytically, city prices may tend to have a higher variance in one country than another 
due to, e.g., a difference in monetary policy between the countries. 
3 Differing slightly from the ER study, we measure the volatility of individual variables 
using variance instead of standard deviation to maintain consistency with our analytical results, 
which are derived in terms of variance as well.  If a
2 = b
2 + c
2, then a ≠ b + c unless either b = 0 
or c = 0.  Hence, working with standard deviation would lead to an unexplained discrepancy 
term.  Similar to our study, Engel and Rogers (2001b) use variance, not standard deviation, to 
measure volatility. 
4 It can further be shown that the estimation of η is also biased in the presence of skewed 
samples.  When nd ≠ nf , υ plus the bias in the η estimate will equal the total bias in the δ 
estimate. 
5 When adapted to the illustrative example in section 2, η is given 
by + − .  Since +  ≥  , a sufficient condition for the differential 
shock effect (i.e., for η > 0) is that > , meaning simply that within-country prices are more 
correlated than cross-border prices are.   
2
d wσ ρ 2
f wσ ρ f d c σ σ ρ 2 2
d σ 2
f σ f dσ σ 2
w ρ c ρ
6 While ξ > 0and η > 0 are sufficient conditions, the necessary and sufficient condition for 
the existence of the border effect is weaker, requiring only that ξ + η > 0. 
7 Consistent with sticky prices, the covariance between exchange rates and prices was 
found to be small in magnitude (less than 4% on average in relative magnitude) compared to 
exchange rate variance. 
8 Seemingly, the exchange rate contribution computed for the ER data sample may even 
exceed the border effect in a number of disaggregate cases.  This situation is misleading and can 
happen only when the border effect is greatly underestimated. 
9 A fixed third-order autoregressive specification, used by the ER study to model price 
processes, was also tried.  Our results were found to be robust with respect to lag selection. 
 
10 The regression takes account of the possible distance effect on relative price volatility.  
  - 19 -Geographic distance between locations is a natural barrier that breeds market segmentation.  
Goods arbitrage is more costly the far apart the cities are.  By hindering goods arbitrage, distance 
may weaken the market linkage of price changes between cities in distant locations, thereby 
making relative price changes more variable.  
11 The ER study suggests an interesting way to gauge the size of the border effect as 
equivalent geographic distance.  Relative to the border coefficient, a small distance coefficient 
will imply a large estimate of the border width.  As shown in Table 4, however, the distance 
coefficient is not statistically significant in 10 out of the 14 cases.
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